中文摘要：

近来频发的突发事件显示了地方政府应急管理水平的滞后,但另一方面,大部分地方政府在应急管理能力建设上却存在消极怠工。在应急管理能力建设中,中央政府与地方政府存在委托代理关系。因此,文中引入委托代理模型针对中央政府如何提高地方政府应急管理能力建设的积极性问题展开研究,并根据博弈模型结果从四个方面设计出具体的激励机制。该激励机制的实施将实现地方政府应急管理能力的提高。

英文摘要：

Recently frequent emergencies show the lower level of local government emergency management capacity, but on the other hand, most of local governments do not actively take action to building capacity of emergency management . In emergency management ability construction, the central government and local government exists principal-agent relationship. Therefor, this paper studies which ways central government could use to encourage local governments to build capacity of emergency management by introducing principal-agent model, and schemes out concrete incentive mechanism from four aspects according to the game model results .The incentive mechanism will be implemented to improve the ability of local government emergency management.