基于顾客行为动态考虑企业渠道选择与定价问题.采用博弈理论,研究由1个制造商、1个具备增值服务能力的零售商以及“战略型”顾客组成的两期销售模型:第1期产品价值不确定,第2期需求随机.每一期,制造商要决定是否在原有的直销渠道上引入零售渠道并制定价格策略,顾客则需选择在哪一期以及从何渠道购买产品.研究表明:1)对制造商而言引入零售渠道优于不引入,同时在不同期引入制造商的价格反应策略不一样;2)当零售商增值服务能力较小时,在整个过程都引入零售渠道为最优,但当增值服务能力很大时,整个过程都引入零售渠道不是最优的情形;3)若制造商与零售商合作决策,在整个过程都引入零售渠道为最优.一些结论与直观相悖.
This paper applies game theory to studing dynamic channel selection and pricing problem based on strategic customer behavior. Suppose there is a manufacturer who sells a fixed number of products to customers directly in a finite horizon with two periods. In period one, there is value uncertainty; in period two, the demand is random. In each period, the manufacturer needs to decide whether introducing a retail channel with value-added service to its existing direct channel or not, and the corresponding pricing strategies. Customers need to decide when and which channel to buy so as to maximize their own surplus. Our results show that it is better for the manufacturer to introduce a retail channel. However, the optimal pricing strategies are different when the retail channel is introduced in different periods. Meanwhile, we find that it is optimal for the manu- facturer to introduce the retailehannel in the whole horizon when the retailer' s service ability is small, but not when the retailer' s service ability is very big. If the manufacturer and the retailer choose to cooperate, it is optimal to introduce the retail channel in the whole horizon regardless of the retailer' s service ability. Some results are counter-intuitive.