研究了质量检验制度下供应链系统的协同质量控制问题。分别考虑了供应商质量努力、自身检验水平信息隐匿以及两者都隐匿时供应链的协同质量控制问题,针对每种情况建立了委托-代理模型,着重考虑产品质量的改进,并通过买方和供应商的交易价格调整质量收益在双方之间的分配。最后,进行了算例分析。
In the inspection regime, the coordination problem in quality control is studied. Information levels concerning the supplier's quality effort and inspection are considered to be hidden. Principal-agent models are developed in different information backgrounds, and product quality improvement is emphasized. In the process, the quality income sharing problem is analyzed to guarantee the feasibility of coordination in quality improvement. At last, a numerical example is explained.