中文摘要：

新疆煤炭资源丰富,开发潜力巨大,但生态环境脆弱,尽快建立和完善煤炭资源开发生态补偿机制是当务之急。通过运用博弈论方法,对新疆煤炭资源开发生态补偿中主要利益相关者间的利益冲突和博弈关系进行分析。结果表明：违规处罚力度、政府检查成本、应缴补偿费与企业违规概率成反比,且重处罚优于勤检查和高收费;只有各利益相关者补偿后的净收益大于零,且生态补偿标准不宜太高,才能确保生态补偿机制的有效运行。基于此,提出建立和完善新疆煤炭资源开发生态补偿机制的具体建议：完善生态补偿立法,加大违规处罚力度;建立部门间的协调机制,努力降低政府监管成本;科学合理确定生态补偿标准;多渠道降低生态补偿成本;全面提高生态补偿的综合效益。

英文摘要：

In Xinjiang, coal resources are abundant and its exploitation has great potential, but ecological envi- ronment is fragile. It is urgent to establish and perfect the eco - compensation mechanism of coal resources ex- ploitation as soon as possible in Xinjiang. In the paper we used the game theory to analyze the interest conflicts and game relationships between main stakeholders of the ecological compensation of coal resources exploitation in Xinjiang. The results indicate that the efforts of violation punishment, the check costs of governments, the com- pensation fees should pay are inversely proportional to the violation probability of coal enterprises, and heavy punishment is superior to frequent checks and high fees ; net income after eco - compensation of the main stake- holders should be greater than zero and ecological compensation standard should not be too high in order to en- sure the eco - compensation mechanism effective. Based on this, specific proposals for establishment and im- provement of the eco - compensation mechanism of coal resources in Xinjiang are put forward, including that per- fecting the legislation of eco - compensation, increasing the intensity of violation punishment; establishing the mechanism of inter - sectional coordination, making great efforts to reduce the costs of government regulation; determining the scientific and rational eco -compensation standards; reducing ecological compensation costs by multi - channel ; improving the comprehensive benefits of eco - compensation from all sides.