中文摘要：

本文研究解决激励问题的两种契约方法。正式契约基于多任务委托代理模型，探讨如何解决代理人重视考核绩效与委托人关注产出价值之间的矛盾，而关系契约基于重复博弈模型，探讨客观测度与主观判断以及短期收益与长期收益之间的矛盾。正式契约与关系契约的结合可以降低代理人所面对的激励扭曲。能够控制委托人违背承诺的诱因。在解决激励问题中应对正式契约和关系契约的合理运用进行综合权衡。

英文摘要：

Two contractual methods are analyzed to solve incentive problems. Formal contract is based on muhi-task model, and emphasizes on the conflictions between performance measure and output contribution. Relational contract is based on repeated game, and focuses on the contradiction between objective measure and subjective judgment. The combination of these two contractual methods will reduce both distortional incentive and reneging temptation during the incentive process.