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新能源汽车产业专利池的形成机制
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:F426[经济管理—产业经济]
  • 作者机构:[1]江苏大学产业经济研究院,江苏镇江212013, [2]江苏大学汽车与交通工程学院,江苏镇江212013, [3]江苏大学科技信息研究所,江苏镇江212013
  • 相关基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71774071,71690241,71673117,71371087); 中国博士后基金资助项目(2016M601568); 教育部人文社会科学青年基金资助项目(14YJC790106); 江苏省软科学项目资助(BR2017024); 江苏大学“青年骨干教师培养工程”资助项目(5521380003)
中文摘要:

针对新能源汽车产业的模块化发展特征,采用动态博弈方法研究该产业中基于产业链的纵向一体化企业和纯上游研发企业专利池的形成机制。构建三阶段的动态博弈模型:第一阶段,专利所有权人决定是否组成专利池;第二阶段,企业根据许可方式来预测行业产量对于许可费率的反应函数;第三阶段,下游制造商进入市场,同时决定最终产品的产量来最大化其利润。根据博弈分析的结果,发现新能源汽车产业纵向一体化企业与纯上游研发企业组建一个专利池,那么无论是纵向一体化企业还是纯上游研发企业,它们获取的利润都要更为理想。同时专利池的组建也会使得下游市场产品总产量提高,价格降低。政府有关部门可以在许可费科学分配、研发合作以及法律法规建设等方面发挥强有力的引导作用,助力新能源汽车产业的专利池发展与长期稳定运营。

英文摘要:

As for the modular development feature of the new energy vehicle industry,dynamic game analysis was adopted to study the patent pool formation mechanism of vertically integrated enterprises and pure upstream R D enterprises.In this paper,a three-stage dynamic game model was constructed.In the first stage,patent owners decided whether to form a patent pool.In the second stage,enterprises forecasted the response function of the industry output to the licensing rates according to the licensing mode.In the third stage,downstream manufacturing businesses entered the market,and simultaneously determined the output of the final product to maximize their profits.The results of game analysis show that both the vertical integration of enterprises or pure upstream R D enterprises will get more ideal profits if they constitute a patent pool.At the same time,the formation of the patent pool will also increase the total output of the downstream market and decrease the prices of goods.The corresponding government departments can play a leading role in the rational allocation of licensing fees,scientific research cooperation and the construction of laws and regulations so as to promote the development and stable operation of the new energy vehicle industry patent pool.

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