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中文摘要：
对轻型分组密码LBiock抗代数旁路攻击安全性进行了评估．给出了LBlock密码算法的代数方程表示方法，使用示波器采集微控制器ATMEGA324P上的LBlock实现功耗泄露，利用泊松相关系数方法推断加密中间状态汉明重，基于可满足性问题并转化为代数方程组，同LBlock密码算法代数方程联立，最后使用CryptoMinisat解析器进行方程组求解，成功恢复加密密钥．实验结果表明：微控制器上的LBlock实现易遭受代数旁路攻击，仅需一条功耗曲线，已知明密文下的3轮汉明重泄露、未知明密文条件下6轮汉明重泄露分别经2．4S和0．4s分析即可恢复80bit完整密钥．
英文摘要：
The security of LBlock, a lightweight block cipher against the algebraic side-channel attack （ASCA） was evaluated. Firstly, the algebraic representation of LBlock was given. Then, the power leakages of LBlock on ATMEGA324P microcontroller were measured by a digital oscilloscope, and some leakage points with obvious power patterns were chosen as the targeted points and used to de- duce the Hamming weights via computing the Pearson correlation factor. The satisfiability-based method was chosen to representing Hamming weights with algebraic equations and combining with al- gebraic equations of LBlock. Finally, the CryptoMinisat solver was applied to solve for the key. Ex- periment results demonstrate that LBlock is vulnerable to ASCA, and full 80 bit master key of LBlock can be derived via analyzing the HW leakages of the first 3 rounds and 6 rounds in a single power trace with 2.4 s and 0.4 s under known and unknown plaintext/ciphertext scenario respectively.
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