中文摘要：

传统网络服务价控策略研究属于规范性范畴，是在用户完全理性的理想假设下展开研究．由于有限的信息及认知能力等的约束，网络服务提供商（Internet Service Provider,ISP）及用户很难做出理性的决策．通过引入用户保留率，将用户对系统服务的响应时间的忍耐考虑到网络服务价控策略之中，运用博弈理论分别给出了基于社会福利最大化与ISP收益最大化下的网络服务拥塞价控策略，并分析了其对用户效用和ISP收益的影响；应用算例比较了基于社会福利最大化与ISP收益最大化下的ISP收益及价控策略变化情况，并对其原因进行了分析．

英文摘要：

Traditional researchs on Internet pricing often employ normative methods under the assumption of completely rational decision-makers. However, it is difficult for both Internet service providers （ISP） and cus- tomers to make rational decisions because of the incomplete information and bounded cognitive abilities in the real world. Considering the bounded rationality by employing the retention rate, this paper constructed conges- tion pricing policies for Internet services with customer impatience under both social welfare maximization and ISP＇s revenue maximization using uncooperative game, respectively. The effects of the two different pricing policies on ISP＇s revenues were analyzed. Numerical examples were performed to show the changes of ISP＇s revenue differences and pricing strategies, respectively.