会计信息在高管动态激励契约中发挥作用,关联交易会影响会计信息的质量,进而会影响其契约有用性。研究发现,我国上市公司高管更换概率与公司会计业绩负相关,关联交易的发生降低了会计信息的契约有用性,而这种影响只发生在其他应收和其他应付两类关联交易中,而商品和劳务购销类的关联交易则没有显著影响。
As the method to measure management-effort-level,the accounting information plays the significant role in stimulating the high-level management dynamic-incentive contract,while the related transaction would affect the quality of accounting information,then would affect its contract usefulness.We find that the replacement of high-level management of Chinese listed companies is negatively related with corporation accounting performance,the occurrence of related transaction would reduce the usefulness of accounting information contract.However,such a deceasing could only happen in "other receivable" and "other payable" items,the related transactions of efficiency-promoting items would not affect the role of accounting information in corporation governance.