中文摘要：

科技的发展使企业与科研机构的合作变得越来越频繁．然而，合作效率不高仍然是目前影响科研成果产业化的最根本原因．针对产学研合作创新中的双边道德风险问题，本文运用委托代理理论具体分析了各种可能情况下不同分配方式对企业、科研机构的不同激励程度，并给出了相应的算例说明．结论认为，含有预付金的分配方式未必能有效地激励科研机构努力，不设有预付金的分配方式（固定支付方式、产出分享方式）很可能更能激励双方努力，预付金额较高反而会降低对科研机构的激励程度．

英文摘要：

Rapid development of science and technology accelerates the pace of collaboration between enterprises and research institutes. However, inefficient cooperation is still the main reason which explains low industrialization of scientific research. With respect to the double-sided moral hazard problem, the principal-agent theory is used to analyze the degree of incentives to enterprises and research institutes, and corresponding numerical examples are presented. The conclusion indicates that distribution methods with- out prepayment （the fixed payment method and the shared profit method） probably encourage both sides efficiently, while distribution methods with relatively high prepayment decrease incentives to institutes.