中文摘要：

以Grossman和Helpman的“保护待售”模型为理论基础，使用1999-2009年案件层面的数据，定量分析印度对华反倾销税裁定的影响因素，揭示中印经济冲突的微观形成机制，可以发现：印度反倾销申诉者的政治势力会显著提高最终裁定的税率水平，进151渗透率同税率之间的关系则取决于申诉者在政治上是否有组织；反倾销税率同印度对华贸易逆差之间呈显著的正相关关系。这意味着，印度当局裁定反倾销税率时，明显受国内利益集团政治势力的影响，同时也有打压中国、谋求在龙象之争中获取优势的动机。

英文摘要：

Employing Grossman and Helpman＇s ＂protection for sale＂ model, this article uses data on anti-dumping actions from 1999 to 2009 to perform a quantitative analysis of factors influencing India＇s determinations of anti-dumping duties against China, and reveals the micro-formation mechanism of economic conflicts between China and India. We find that the political power of India＇s anti-dumping plaintiffs markedly increases the tariff level of its final determinations and that the relationship between the import penetration ratio and duty rates depends upon whether the plaintiffs are politically organized. Further, there is a significant positive correlation between India＇s anti-dumping duty rates and its unfavorable trade balance with China. This indicates that in determining anti-dumping duties, Indian authorities are clearly influenced by the political clout of their domestic interest groups. They are also motivated by the desire to keep down China and gain the upper hand in the face-off between the ＂dragon and the elephant.＂