中文摘要：

以2003～2005年间进行了业绩预告的447家上市公司为研究样本．对管理层的年度盈利预测误差与自愿性会计政策变更关系进行的实证研究表明：管理层的年度盈利预测准确性并不优于证券分析师；当管理层的负预测误差超过20％时，公司往往采取提高当期盈利的自愿性会计政策变更；并且公司管理层采取自愿性会计政策变更后确实能够减小预测误差，使其至少达到了证券分析师的盈利预测误差水平。

英文摘要：

The paper collects 447 sample firms which have released management earnings forecasts during 2003- 2005, then conducts empirical tests to find out the relation between management earnings forecast errors and voluntary accounting changes. The empirical results indicate that there is not the comparatively higher accuracy of management earnings forecasts relative to security analyst. When the negative forecast errors for firm＇s management are higher compared to 20%, voluntary accounting changes which increases the earnings will be adopted. Then the forecast errors of the firm＇s management are reduced to the analysts＇ degree after the adoption of voluntary accounting changes.