中文摘要：

目前，学术界对于竞争机制激励效果的研究，还主要聚焦在获胜者奖金设置区间、竞争人数等外在因素，较少关注个体偏好与竞争机制的相互匹配效应。笔者遵循实验经济学的研究范式，通过设计需付出真实努力的工作任务和不同工资方式的实验来测度人们的竞争意愿，考察落后厌恶、领先厌恶与竞争意愿的作用机制，从公平偏好理论视角探寻参与者特征与激励机制的匹配关系。实验结果表明：（1）落后厌恶抑制了人们的竞争意愿，领先厌恶则不影响人们的竞争意愿；（2）男性被试和女性被试选择锦标赛工资形式的比例分别为54．762％和22．500％，被试竞争意愿较弱，且存在性别差异；（3）本实验中的被试较少关注他人及社会福利，表现得较为自利，其在修正的独裁者博弈中往往选择自己利益最大化的分配方案，而非双方都均等的分配方案。基于此，我们可以得出如下结论：高竞争强度的激励机制会导致部分高能力参与者没有被甄别，组织利用锦标赛等竞争性激励机制时，需要考虑其使用环境、参与者的社会偏好等。

英文摘要：

The present research which studies the incentive effect of competition mechanism is mainly from external factors such as the winner of the prize, the number of competitors, less concerned mutual matching effect between individual preferences and competition mechanism. Using experimental economics research paradigm , we organize an experiment in which participants need to solve a real task. Participants are then asked to select a noncompetitive piece-rate scheme or a competitive tournament scheme for their performance. We study the matching relation between competitive willingness, aheadness aversion, and behindness aversion. This study uses equity preference theory to explore the matching relationship between participant preferences and incentive mechanism. We find a significantly negative relationship between behindness aversion and selfselection into competitive tournament scheme. But fail to find such a relationship between aheadness aversion and self-selection. The results show that our samples＇ competitive willingness is weak. We also find that gender shows significantly differences in competitive willingness. 54. 762 percent of male and 22. 500 percent of female choose to compete. Our samples have the characteristics of self-centeredness and are less concerned about the interests of others and society. So they tend to choose the most profitable distribution scheme for themselves in the amending dictator game instead of the equal distribution for both sides. Studies have shown that we need to consider the usage environment of tournament, the participant＇s social preferences when orga-nizations use tournament competitive incentive mechanism. Incentive mechanism of high intensity of competition will lead to some high ability participants had not been identified.