中文摘要：

控制权配置是科技型创业企业的重要治理机制。通过构建理论模型并采用Matlab仿真方法,探讨了联合控制模式下科技型创业企业的控制权配置机理。研究结果表明：创业企业获得融资额、风险投资家监督与干预成本、风险规避度与剩余控制权（λ1）呈正向关系,与特定控制权（λ2）呈负向关系;清算价值、创业企业收益、风险投资家获得的剩余索取权、项目成功概率与剩余控制权呈负向关系,与特定控制权呈正向关系;创业企业共享收益与剩余控制权的关系需要满足特定条件,而与特定控制权呈正向关系;创业企业家私人收益、风险投资家战略收益与λ1、λ2需要满足特定的条件时才能反映其变化关系。

英文摘要：

It is an important administrative mechanism for sic- tech pioneering enterprises to allocate their control rights. By building a theoretical model and using Matlab simulation software,the paper explores the configuration mechanism of control rightsin sci- tech pioneering enterprises under the mode of a joint control. The results show that： The obtained financing amount of entrepreneurial enterprises,the supervision and intervention cost of venture capitalists,the degree of risk aversion and residual control rights were positively correlated,but these factors and special control rights were negatively correlated; Liquidation value,entrepreneurial enterprise earnings,residual claim rights venture capitalists obtained,probability of project success were negatively correlated with residual control rights,and are positively correlated with special control rights; the relationship between shared benefits of pioneering enterprises and residual control rights needs to meet certain conditions,taking on positive correlation to the special control rights; The relationship between private benefits of entrepreneurs,venture capitalist＇s strategic benefits,and residual control rights special control rights can reflect changing relationship only by meeting the special conditions.