中文摘要：

基于行为经济学损失规避假说和高技术企业数据,采用层级回归及三重交互模型,探讨了以管理团队薪酬集中度来测量的核心高管权力对企业资本投入的影响,以及行业薪酬地位和股权集中度的复杂调节效应.结果表明,核心高管权力与资本投入存在显著负向关系,而行业薪酬地位和股权集中度对二者关系均存在弱化调节效应,并且核心高管权力、行业薪酬地位与股权集中度之间存在三重交互效应,即股权集中度的提高会增强行业薪酬地位对核心高管权力与资本投入关系的调节效应.研究结果对上市公司管理团队的权力治理及激励机制改革具有重要实践启示意义.

英文摘要：

Based on loss aversion assumption in behavioral economics and high-tech enterprises data,using hierarchical regression and three-way interaction model,this paper explores the influence of key executives’ power measured by management team’s compensation concentration on capital investment and complex moderating effect of salary position of key executives in industry and equity concentration of enterprises.The results are as follow：key executives’ power has significant negative effect on capital investment.Either salary position in industry or equity concentration has significant moderating effect on the relationship between key executives’ power and capital investment respectively.Key executives’ power,salary position in industry and equity concentration have three-way interaction effect：When the equity concentration is high,the moderating effect of salary position in industry on the relationship of key executives’ power and capital investment is stronger.The research results have important practical implications for the reform of the power management and incentive mechanism of the listed company’s management team.