中文摘要：

中国行政制度变革中存在着一个明显的悖论，以博弈论为工具分析悖论的演化过程，结果表明：随着制度变革的深入，其初期所具备的帕累托改进特性正在逐渐消失，面对日益复杂的社会矛盾，在缺乏有效外部制约的背景下，利益非中性的政府推动行政制度变革的动为也在弱化，变革悖论使得制度转型面临着低效锁定的风险。破解悖论的唯一途径在于培育公民社会，形成一种对分散的个体需求进行集结和表达的有效机制，通过确保社会力量的有效参与和制衡将会使良性制度变革成为不可逆的社会过程。

英文摘要：

There is an evident paradox in Chinese administrative system transformation, the solution of which is the crux for the success of Chinese public administration reform. A scrutiny with the game theory of the paradox evolution process shows that the Pareto improvement traits in early stage reform have disappeared when reformers stepped into deepwater area. Faced with complex interest conflicts, the non-neutral governments lack incentives to prompt the transformation when without external re- strictions. And in the end the paradox will drive the reform into ineffective lock-on. The sole solution lies in civil society cultiva tion to aggregate and express demands of the public. At the same time,the legal guarantee for social participation to the transformation will make the reform an irreversible process.