中文摘要：

针对由一个线上零售商和一个线下体验店构成的＂线下体验＋线上购买＂O2O供应链,考虑线下体验店体验服务成本信息不对称,建立信息对称与不对称情形下的委托代理模型,研究线上零售商佣金契约设计问题;进而分析佣金契约的性质,考察不对称信息对零售商、体验店及O2O供应链绩效的影响。研究结果表明：基于不同成本类型的体验店,线上零售商设计佣金契约的激励目的不一样;不对称信息的存在会使佣金契约参数发生变化,但不对称信息不一定会降低O2O供应链绩效或产生信息租金。

英文摘要：

Considering an offline to online （O2O） supply chain consisting of an online retailer and a showroom under asymmetry cost information, principal-agent models are established with asymmet- ric cost information and full information respectively. The optimal commission contract is proposed under information asymmetry and the properties of the optimal commission contract are analyzed. Further, the impacts of asymmetry cost information on the profit of the online retailer, the showroom and the whole O2O supply chain are analyzed. The results show that, the purpose to design the com- mission contract varies from the types of showrooms. In conclusion, the existence of asymmetry infor- mation leads to the change of commission contract parameters, while the asymmetry information may not decrease the performance of O2O supply chain or generates extra information rent.