中文摘要：

针对供应链多阶段合作中的逆向选择问题,研究非对称信息下供应商的商业信用契约激励机制设计问题。基于商业信用契约构建和求解单阶段的信息甄别模型,探讨非对称信息下供应链的两阶段动态博弈机理,基于贝叶斯更新机制分析不同阶段的信息相关性;采用机制设计理论提出两阶段的商业信用信息甄别模型,基于拉格朗日方法求解模型,给出了不同阶段供应商的商业信用激励契约。比较了不同合作模式下商业信用契约对供应链决策和利润的影响,并讨论了不同阶段参数设计对契约的影响。研究表明,通过设计合理的商业信用激励契约,可以激励零售商披露其真实成本,防止发生逆向选择,从而增加供应链利润。

英文摘要：

For the adverse selection in the multi-period collaboration of supply chain,the design of incentive mechanism based on trade credit contract by the supplier was investigated.The one-stage information screening model was built and solved.Based on the above,the two-stage dynamic game mechanism of supply chain under asymmetric information was discussed,and the information relevance between different stages was analyzed based on Bayesian information updating.The first-stage and second-stage incentive models based on trade credit were respectively proposed and analyzed,and the trade credit incentive contracts in the two stages were obtained.The effects of trade credit contracts on policies and profits of the supply chain under different collaboration modes were compared.The influence of relevant parameters on the contracts was discussed.The results showed that trade credit contract designed reasonably could inspire the retailer to reveal its true cost and prevent adverse selection happening,as well as improve profits of the supply chain.