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中文摘要：
本文通过将投资方的公平感知引入模型,研究了投资方从事多项任务时政府激励机制的设计问题。研究发现：当投资方的成本函数相互独立时,政府方的激励也是独立的;而当投资方的成本函数相互依存时,政府方的激励方式取决于投资方的行为结果的观测性。若投资方的行为结果不可观测,那么政府方对于该行为的激励是独立的;若投资方的行为结果可观测,则政府方对于该行为的激励方式取决于该行为的成本函数与不可观测的行为活动的成本函数之间的依存关系。最后,公平工资水平不会影响到激励强度的变化,但投资方自身的公平感知能够对政府方的激励机制产生影响。
英文摘要：
This paper demonstrates how the incentive mechanism is made by government when the investor is engaged in several tasks through bringing fairness preference into multi-task principal-agent. The result suggests that the relevance of the investor＇s cost function has great effect on the incentive mechanism. The incentive from government is independent on the condition that the cost function is independent of each other,otherwise the result of investor＇s behaviors should be considered. If the result of the investor＇s behavior is unobservable,then the incentive mechanism is not related to cost. However,If the result of the investor＇s behavior is observable,the incentive mechanism should dependent on the relationship among cost functions. Finally,fairness income has no effect on incentive,but the fairness preference from the investor has impact on the incentive mechanism.
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