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基于Stackelberg博弈的VRC知识共享决策分析
  • 期刊名称:华中科技大学学报(自然科学版).37(12).87-91,2009.12
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:O225[理学—运筹学与控制论;理学—数学] TP18[自动化与计算机技术—控制科学与工程;自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程]
  • 作者机构:[1]华中科技大学水电与数字化工程学院,湖北武汉430074, [2]二滩水电开发有限责任公司,四川成都610021
  • 相关基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(50679098);科技部水利部公益性行业科研专项基金资助项目(200701008).
  • 相关项目:基于知识管理的虚拟研究模式及其网络管理信息系统
中文摘要:

针对虚拟研究中心知识共享中存在的机会主义行为和自我保护意识等问题,提出了一种基于Stackelberg主从博弈的虚拟研究中心知识共享决策模型,求解出了博弈过程中知识共享决策总体投入的均衡值、各成员的知识共享率及知识共享总体收益;分析了影响博弈结果的各参数之间的相互关系.并与基于Cournot博弈的知识共享决策模型的均衡值进行了对比,指出基于Stackelberg博弈的优先决策模型更有利于虚拟研究中心项目小组整体绩效的提升。结合雅砻江水电开发虚拟研究中心的知识共享决策进行了实例分析,研究表明基于Stackelberg主从博弈模型能有效促成虚拟研究中心的知识共享、交流和创新,有助于虚拟研究中心成员实现各自利益的最大化.

英文摘要:

To solve the problems caused by opportunism behaviors and self-protection consciousness during knowledge sharing in virtual research center (VRC), a knowledge sharing decision model based on Stackelberg leader-follower game is proposed. Using this model, the equilibrium values of relevant efforts made by both parties in knowledge sharing, the knowledge sharing rates of members and the total expected gain from knowledge sharing were determined in the decision-making process. Then the relationship among the parameters of game results was analyzed. By comparing with the equilibrium values of knowledge sharing based on Cournot game model, the priority decision model based on Stackelberg game is proved to be more beneficial to promote the whole performance of project team of VRC. The knowledge sharing decision of Yalong river hydropower development VRC was taken as an example. The results show that it is an effective way for members of VRC to share knowledge, communicate and innovate to maximize the benefits of each other by building the knowledge sharing decision model proposed above.

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