中文摘要：

中小公司在外部环境约束与内部发展选择中，自发形成了股东会、董事会、监事会三会合一的内部治理结构。在该结构中，委托一代理问题成为了监督权、决策权、经营权相互监督、相互约束、相互激励的三权合一内部相互委托一代理组织制衡机制。针对该模式，运用奥尔森小集团经济行为理论、青木昌彦的信息关联模式进行分析发现，该模式具有自我保障、自我激励、自我监督的“三自”原则效率，并对进一步完善该模式提出了相应的政策建议。

英文摘要：

The article analyzes the corporate governance structure consisting of shareholdersineeting;directorate and superintendents＇meeting in small -medium sized family companies and reveals that entrust -agent question becomes the supervisory authority, the decision - making power, the fight of management. The three fights will mutually supervise, control and encourage which has gathered an internal mutually entrust - agent balance system. The model has the characteristics of self - protecting, self- encouraging and self - supervising. Finally the author has proposed some policy advices on improving the model by means of the small group economic behavior theory made by Mancur Olson and relative system theory made by Haken.