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中文摘要：
政府在对养老金缺口补贴时，必须维持公共债务低于警戒值。本文在世代交叠模型框架下考察养老保险和公共债务的关系。理论分析表明，当人口增长率大于投资收益率，公共债务才能逐渐减少或收敛于长期稳态；而提高养老金则具有增加居民终生收入、提高出生率，进而间接地降低长期债务水平的效果。此外，假设中国公共债务分别收敛于不同的警戒值，模拟2010-2070年养老保险运行：均衡债务水平越高，养老保险收支缺口出现越早，赤字累积越大。同时，高债务还将提高未来利率和税收负担率．降低大多数世代的福利水平。
英文摘要：
Since the government is responsible for financing pension payment, a sustainable pension system must maintain public debt below a certain threshold. A overlapping generation model indicates that the debt-GDP ratio keeps decreasing or converges to a steady state only when population growth rate exceeds interest rate. So increasing pension benefits would reduce public debt per capita in the long run through improving lifetime income and fertility. Then this paper considers three cases when the debt-GDP ratio converges to different threshold values. The higher the equilibrium debt, the earlier the pension deficit emerges, and the larger the accumulated deficit. With rising interest rate and tax burden, higher steady-state level of public debt reduces utility of most generations.
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