中文摘要：

采用委托一代理理论中的激励模型对经理在企业经营中的风险分担和努力水平进行分析发现：对称信息情况下帕累托最优风险分担和最优努力水平是可以达到的，信息不对称情况下的帕累托最优风险分担是不可能达到的，因此经理有动机采取其他方式取得股东承诺报酬以外的收益来分散经营风险带来的不利的人力资本雇佣后果，这一结果表明股东与经理之间的信息不对称导致风险分担和激励问题是引发经理管理防御动机和行为的外在诱因．

英文摘要：

The paper analyzes the risk-sharing and effort level of managers in the enterprise management by using the incentive model of the principal-agent theory. The analysis shows that Pareto optimal risk-sharing and the optimal effort level can be reached with symmetric information, while Pareto optimal risk-sharing can not be reached with asymmetric information. Therefore, the managers have the incentive to choose other ways to get extra income beyond the reward that shareholders promise to disperse the risk of adverse human capital employment consequences. The result shows that the risk-sharing and incentive problems between shareholders and managers caused by asymmetric information is an external cause for managers＇ managerial entrenchment motivation and behavior.