欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
基于当前食品安全现状,通过对食品企业和消费者利益演化机制的分析,建立了消费者和食品企业之间的演化博弈模型,得出消费者参与监督会影响食品安全问题解决的结论,并借助模型分析了他们各自的均衡策略.当食品企业生产合格产品时,消费者会选择不举报;而当食品企业生产劣质产品时,会有小比例的消费者选择举报和监督.最初这个比例是很小的,随着消费者长时间的学习,最终选择“监督”的消费者会占较大比例.当消费者监督时,企业会逐步向生产优质产品的策略转化.
英文摘要：
Based on the current food safety status, the paper establishes an evolutionary game model between consumers and food companies through analyzing the evolutionary mechanism of their interest. Then a conclusion is made that consumers＇ participation in monitoring will affect the solution of food safety problems. We also analyze their equilibrium strategies through the model and find that consumers will not report when food businesses produce quality food, while a small proportion of consumers will report and supervise when food businesses pro- duce inferior food. The proportion of consumer supervision is rather small at the much higher proportion with the constant learning of consumers. Finally, with companies will choose to shift to strategy of producing quality food. beginning, but will grow to a consumers＇ supervision, food .
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
期刊信息
位置：