中文摘要：

构建了制造商通过销售回馈与惩罚契约来对具有公平偏好的零售商群体的销售努力进行激励的计算实验模型.研究了零售商之间的行为外部性对激励效果产生的影响,并将EWA算法引入到制造商动态调整奖励与惩罚力度过程中以改善自身收益,为制造商在多周期激励过程中合理利用零售商间的行为外部性、合理制定奖惩力度提供理论依据.实验结果表明：制造商应采取措施尽量使零售商之间销售行为的外部性保持较低程度;在多周期激励过程中,制造商采用动态激励方式会优于保持奖惩力度不变的静态激励方式;动态调整奖惩力度会极大程度影响被奖励零售商群体的销售努力水平,但并不会影响被惩罚零售商销售努力水平的演化趋势.

英文摘要：

This paper builds a computational experiment model in which the manufacturer encourages the group of retailers to increase sale efforts using sales rebate and penalty contracts. We assumed that the retailers have fairness preference and study the impact of external effects among retailers on the incentive effects. The EWA algorithm is applied to the process of the manufacturer adjusting the incentives and penalties dynamically to maximize her own benefits. The aim of this paper is to provide suggestions to manufacturers to make rewards and punishments and use the external effects among retailers reasonably in multi-cycle periods. The results show that： the manufacturer should take measures to minimize the retailers＂free rider＂behavior,but not to eliminate this behavior completely; the dynamic incentives will be better than the static incentives in multi-cycle incentive periods. Dynamic adjustment of rewards and punishments will greatly affect the level of the average sales efforts of retailers who have been motivated,but cannot affect the evolution trends of sales efforts of retailers who have been punished.