以1998-2004年间上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所发行A股的上市公司中被冠以ST的93家非国有上市公司为研究样本,实证分析董事会过度自信行为对公司经营业绩的影响。经验证据表明,在上市公司经营业绩不好、公司被ST处理的情况下,过度自信的董事会没有及时更换公司CEO,这可能表明这类董事会过高地估计了CEO的经营管理能力给公司所带来的收益,过低地估计了CEO不善的经营管理能力给公司所带来的风险。实证结果说明,诸如过度自信之类的董事会的非理性行为给公司经营业绩带来负面的影响。
Using a sample of 93 special treatment non-state-owned listed companies from 1998 to 2004, the paper empirically analyses how board's overconfident behaviors affect corporate performance. The empirical study shows that when the listed companies are specially treated-which shows the companies were in finance distress,some overconfident board does not change the CEO in time. This may mean the board overestimates the gain the CEO can bring to the company,but underestimates the risk. The empirical result supports that board's overconfident behaviors have negative influence on corporation performance.