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中文摘要：
以不完全契约为基础,在金融契约和控制权配置理论的框架内,运用博弈分析方法,基于附属公司或银行的创业投资机构（长期投资家）与独立的投资机构（短期投资家）在投资金额、增值服务等方面存在的差异,通过引入企业家事前努力水平、投资家投资额和管理监督成本、项目清算价值等变量,构建了两类投资家下创业企业控制权动态配置模型,研究如何设计短期与长期投资家下的创业投资契约,确定企业控制权最优配置。研究表明：当企业家选择长期投资家,不论企业家或投资家谁拥有控制权,均可实现控制权相对较优配置;当企业家选择短期投资家,由企业家拥有控制权可以实现控制权相对较优配置。
英文摘要：
Based on the incomplete contract,within the framework of financing contracts and control rights allocation theory,this paper introduced the entrepreneur＇s ex ante effort,investor＇s investment,manage and monitor cost,project＇s liquidation values,etc,and then it built up the model of dynamic control rights allocation of two types of venture capital in VC-backed firms,and analyzed how to design short-term and long-term venture capital,determine the optimal control rights allocation by game analysis,based on the differences between corporate or bank-affiliated venture capital（ long-term investor） and independent venture capital（ short-term investor） in the investor＇s investment and value-added services. Results showed that,when entrepreneurs choose long-term investors,no matter who owns the control,the relatively optimal control rights allocation can be achieved; when entrepreneurs choose short-term investors,the entrepreneur hold the control rights can realize the relatively optimal control rights allocation.
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