中文摘要：

本文基于信息不对称理论,运用剩余收益评估模型控制IPO公司的内在价值,对我国创业板IPO过程中承销商的定价效率进行了实证研究。结果表明,在我国证券市场效率不高的背景下,不完善的声誉机制无法约束承销商的机会主义行为,导致承销商第三方认证功能弱化,发行价格偏离内在价值,不能有效降低发行人和投资者的信息不对称程度。承销商的机会主义行为造成发行人和承销商的利益趋同。在发行价格与抑价程度不存在显著关系的情况下,配合承销商的机会主义行为采取高报价策略争取配售份额是询价投资者的占优选择。

英文摘要：

The main purpose of issuers hiring underwriters during the course of IPO is to reduce financing costs and ensure a successful issue.The issuers may stem from self-serving motive for providing false information to make the issue price deviate from real value.The information asymmetry between issuers and investors may result from investors’ adverse selection behavior,which will increase issuers’ financing costs and make issuers face the risk of failure issue.Therefore,issuers need the third-party who is trusted by invertors to pass the private information of corporate quality at low costs.The underwriters play the role of third-party certification to pass valuable information to information inferiority investors.The underwriters’ reputation mechanism is the key of ensuring that underwriters achieve a successful third-party certification and acquire investors’ trust.However,under the background of the new stock fall on its first day of trading and high underpricing co-existing in China Growth Enterprise market,there is one important question still remains unresolved,which is whether underwriters reputation mechanism is perfect enough to bind underwriters op-portunistic behavior.This paper firstly make an empirical test on underwriters effect on IPO issue price efficiency in China growth enterprise market based on information asymmetry theory,by us-ing the residual income valuation mode to control IPO company’s intrinsic value influence.The results show in the context of China security market efficiency being not high,imperfect reputation mechanism can’t constrain underwriter’s opportunism behavior leading to third-party authentication function weakened,IPO issue price in China growth enterprise market deviates from intrinsic value and underwriters can’t reduce information asymmetry level between issuers and investors.Underwriter’s opportunism behavior makes underwriters and issuers interests become convergence.In the condition of he issue price and underpricing having no significant relationships,c