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中文摘要：
研究了政府低碳减排价格补贴对于由供应商主导的两级供应链决策的影响。在改进的报童模型基础上,分别针对单独补贴和同时补贴的情形,建立了分散决策时的Stackelberg博弈模型和集中决策模型,求解最优订货量、批发价格和减排努力量。发现同时补贴两个节点企业时供应链趋于协调,优于只补贴其中一个企业的情形。证明了政府制定的减排价格补贴函数,可以是一个关于减排努力量的线性函数或者非线性的凹函数。
英文摘要：
This paper evaluates the influence of government＇ s low-carbon subsidies upon a two-stage supply chain that includes a dominant supplier and a subordinate distributor. By employing the improved newsvendor model, the study develops decentralized Stackelberg game models under three different scenarios, where the government provides the low-carbon subsidies to both of the supplier and distributor or to only one of them. The optimal order quantity, whole-sale price and the amount of effort to reduce carbon emission are derived respectively. The study finds that the supply chain will be coordinated under the condition of stochastic demand, if the government simul- taneously gives the subsidies to both of the supplier and the distributor. It is also concluded that the government＇ s subsidy function can be a liner function or a non-liner concave function.
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