中文摘要：

通过建立政府、新能源企业、传统能源企业三方三阶段博弈模型，分析政府对新能源企业实施的研发补贴及支持价格这两种规制工具的最优组合。结果表明，在社会福利最大化目标下，政府可运用的两种规制工具是相互替代的。在产业发展初期，支持价格是迅速扩大市场份额的最有效手段；而从中长期来看，研发补贴是真正提高新能源产业竞争的最关键手段。研发效率水平越高、市场规模以及污染损害系数越大，政府越倾向于运用支持价格进行规制；而新能源企业的边际生产成本越高，政府越倾向于运用研发补贴方式进行规制。

英文摘要：

By establishing a 3-stage game model of the three parties of government, new energy enterprise and （Taditional energy enterprise, this paper makes an analysis of the optimal combination of regulation tools between Government R＆D subsidy and the support price for the new energy enterprises. The results show that with the maximized objective of social welfare, the two kinds of regulation tools used by the government can substitute each other. At the initial development stage of the industry, the support price is the most effective means to extend market shares rapidly; while in the medium and long run, R＆D subsidy is the most important key to really improve the competitiveness of the new energy industry. The higher the R＆D efficiency and the larger the market scale and pollution coefficient, the more inclined the government is to use support price for regulation; while the higher the marginal production cost of the new energy enterprise, the more inclined the government is to use R＆D subsidy for regulation.