通过对唐人神股份有限公司进行累计超额收益以及财务指标分析,发现唐人神股份有限公司的高管存在出于节税目的选择在公司股价处于低位时行权的行为,并伴随有操控信息披露以及盈余管理的行为。在我国民营上市公司所有权与经营权高度集中的情况下,这种机会主义行为更加可能出现,从而使股权激励计划的激励效用降低。对此,建议完善公司治理结构、加大监管力度,并调整股票期权纳税时点以及主要激励对象。
In this paper, through the cumulative abnormal return and financial index analysis of TangRenShen Group t~o. Ltd. we find that executives intend to take exercise motivation to choose to take options under lower stock price, with being accompanied by a manipulation of information disclosure and earnings management behavior. In the case of high concentration of ownership and manage- ment right of private listing Corporation, the opportunistic behavior is more likely to occur, so that the incentive effect of stock incentive plan is reduced. This paper puts forward some relevant suggestions.