中文摘要：

通过引入人类社会组织的激励机制,研究网络初始状态存在少量合作者时的囚徒困境博弈行为演化,着重探讨激励机制在网络结构作用条件下对群体合作行为产生的影响.首先从理论层面分析当方格网上存在一个合作者时,合作行为演化形成合作者聚集结构的激励条件;然后采用仿真实验方法研究方格网、规则小世界网络和异质小世界网络上随机分布少量合作者时,激励机制对合作行为演化的影响.研究发现,激励机制在不同的网络结构上总体表现出对合作行为演化的促进作用.但是在方格网和规则小世界网络上,由于节点度的同质化效应,针对合作行为的激励有时不一定会产生更好的合作状态,甚至可能起到负面的效果.

英文摘要：

The evolution of cooperation behaviors in the prisoner＇s dilemma game on complex networks depends on the sufficient cooperators in the initial state.By introducing the incentive mechanism of human social organizations,this paper studied the evolution of cooperative behaviors in the prisoner＇s dilemma game while a small amount cooperators exist in the initial state,and focus on the effect of incentive on the evolution of cooperative behaviors under the network structures constrains.First,an incentive condition on square lattice was theoretically analyzed.Under that condition,a single cooperator on square lattice can evolve to form the clusters of cooperators.Then,by using simulation,the effects of incentive mechanism on the evolution of cooperative behaviors were explored while a small amount of initial cooperators were randomly distributed on square lattice,regular small world network and heterogeneous network,respectively.The results show that incentive mechanism facilitates the evolution of cooperative behaviors in general.But on the square lattice and regular small world network,the incentive mechanism sometimes does not necessarily correspond to better cooperation status,and even has negative effect.These results have important inspiration on management practice.