中文摘要：

利用会计研究法、“分类加权的FA-DEA”法、事件研究法以及Tobit回归模型等方法，对整体上市前后样本公司的效率变化及其影响因素进行实证研究，并建立理论模型解释实证发现．多方面证据表明：尽管短期内整体上市大幅度提高了大股东对上市公司的控制力，并实现了上市公司经营规模的快速扩张，但未能带来中长期收益和效率的提高，公司股票也并未给长期投资者带来显著的超额收益；大股东的国有属性对公司效率具有负面影响．理论模型的分析表明，整体上市这类表面上的大股东“支撑行为”实际上可能侵占了小股东利益．这意味着整体上市成为大股东侵占小股东利益的新途径，有必要完善相关政策，切实保护中小投资者的合法权益．

英文摘要：

This paper uses the accounting study method, improved FA-DEA, event study method and tobit re- gression method to study the efficiency changes of listed companies implementing holistic listing and their influ- encing factors, and constructs a theoretic model to explain the empirical results. The empirical results show that, although holistic listing increases the controlling proportion of listed companies for major shareholders and expands the operation scale in the short-term, it does not accordingly improve the profit and efficiency and ex- cess earnings for their long-term investors. The regression also finds that holistic listing and the state-owned property of major shareholders have negative impacts on efficiency. The theoretic model indicates that the new asset injected by major shareholders is likely to be ＂bad asset＂ in contrast to the old asset of listed companies and that it doesn＇t create new value. These findings mean the seeming ＂propping＂ may be ＂tunneling＂ in fact, and holistic listing may become a new way for benefit expropriation.