通过手工收集2008-2013年国有上市公司中非国有股东的持股及委派高管数据,实证检验非国有股东参与国有企业治理能否改善国有企业会计信息质量。结果表明,非国有股东持股比例与国有企业的会计信息质量不存在显著关系,而非国有股东委派高管能有效提高国有企业会计信息质量。进一步研究发现,非国有股东对国有企业会计信息质量的提升作用在外部审计和内部控制水平较低的国有企业更加显著。研究表明,在内外部治理水平较低的情况下,非国有股东仅持有公司股权难以有效提高国有企业会计信息质量,非国有股东委派高管代表参与国有企业治理更能发挥积极的治理作用。
The data of shareholding ratio of non-state shareholders and the percentage of senior executive appointed by the non-state shareholders between 2008 and 2013 are used to examine whether non-state shareholders taking part in the corporate governance of SOE improves the accounting information quality of SOEs. The empirical results show that the shareholding ratio of non- state shareholders is not significantly related with the accounting information quality, while the percentage of senior executive appointed by the non-state shareholders is positively related with it. Further results show that the positive correlation only exists in SOEs with low audit- quality or low level of internal control. These results indicate that when SOEs have low internal or external governance, for non- state shareholders, only holding shares can' t improve the accounting information quality of SOEs, while appointing senior executive to participate in the corporate governance of SOEs can play a positive role.