中文摘要：

行人与车辆在穿越无信号路口时的行为冲突尤其具有危险性，行人和机动车不仅具有运动特征，更具有行为特征，因此需要从社会学层面对人车路口穿越问题进行建模．通过对无信号路口处人车干扰机理的深入剖析，提出基于脏脸博弈模型研究人车“理性人”的行为特征以及交互行为背后的微观机理j分析了人车穿越路口时共同知识的形成过程、人车双方优势策略的产生机理和人车脏脸博弈的动力学过程．理论推导了人、车收益的数学期望和发生人车冲突的概率．分析结果表明：行人穿越的理论时间和机动车穿越的理论时间越接近，人车越容易发生冲突．同时，进一步分析了不同车型、不同行人等待时间和个体认知能力异质性对人车冲突概率的影响．

英文摘要：

The conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles at unsignalized intersections are rather dangerous. Desmes ~nv motion features, pedestrians and vehicle drivers also have behavioral features, so modelling the crossing behaviors of pedestrians and vehicles from the sociological aspect is necessary. Through an in-depth analysis of the interference mechanism between pedestrians and vehicles at unsignalized intersections, in this paper, a dirty faces game to analyze the crossing behaviors of pedestrians and vehicles as ＂rational man＂ is proposed. The formation process of common knowledge, the producing mechanism of dominant strategy and the kinetic process of dirty faces game are analyzed. Under the assumption of probability of the dominant strategy and distribution of crossing times, theoretical derivations of the benefits gained by pedestrians and vehicles as well as the conflict probability are given. Results show that a collision is more likely to occur when the theoretical time of pedestrian passing through is closer to that of the vehicle driver, and this is consistent with the actual situation. Furthermore, the influences of vehicle type, waiting time and heterogeneity of pedestrians on the conflict probability are also considered.