中文摘要：

本文利用中国上市公司2006-2013年的股票期权激励计划数据．研究业绩型股票期权中管理层收益及其对激励效果的影响。研究发现．相当一部分完成行权条件中业绩要求的管理层并不能从股票期权中获得收益或者获得的收益十分有限。进一步的研究发现．管理层预期的股票期权价值越小．管理层达到当前行权期业绩要求的概率越小。另外．管理层利用上一个行权期的实际收益预期的期权收益越小．管理层达到当前行权期业绩要求的概率越小。最后。管理层从股票期权中获得的总收益越小，股票期权计划完成后的公司业绩也会越差。这些发现均说明．管理层收益较低将导致业绩型股票期权无法达到理想的激励效果．使得行权条件中的业绩要求无法完成．公司长期业绩也不能得到有效的提升。现有文献普遍认为中国上市公司实施的业绩型股票期权激励效果不佳的主要原因是管理层权力主导下的激励契约福利化，而上述发现为这一问题提供了新解释。

英文摘要：

Using the data of stock option incentive plans of the Chinese listed companies during 2006 to 2013, the study investigates the management interests and its impact on the incentive effects in the performance- vested stock options. The study finds that many management who achieve the performance targets in the exercise conditions do not get interests or get limited interests from the stock options. Further study reveals that the less the stock option value that the management expects is, the smaller the probability that the management achieves the performance targets of the current exercise period is. In addition, the smaller the stock option interests that the management expects by using the actual interests in the last exercise period is, the smaller the probability that the management achieves the performance targets of the current exercise period is. At last, the smaller the total interests that the management obtains from the stock options is, the worse the performance of the companies after the completion of the stock options plan is. These findings all show that the low interests of the management could make the performance-vested stock options unable to achieve the desired incentive effects, and thus the performance targets in the exercise conditions could not be completed and the long-term performance of the companies could not be effectively improved. Existing literature generally considers the main cause of poor incentive effects of the performance-vested stock options implemented by the Chinese listed companies to be the welfare effects in the incentive contracts under the management power, but the above findings provide a new explanation for this problem.