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中文摘要：
党组织参与公司治理是我国公司治理最大的特点，并且是制约内部人控制的重要的平衡力量。本文以2008--2010年A股披露了党委会与公司董事会、监事会以及高管层人员重合与任职信息的国有上市公司为样本．以党委会“双向进入、交叉任职”这一领导体制为研究对象检验其对公司治理、董事会效率的影响。研究发现，党委会“双向进入”程度与公司治理水平呈倒“U”型关系．与董事会效率正相关，而“交叉任职”可以显著影响公司治理水平．但董事长担任党委书记不利于公司治理水平的提高。研究结果为我国优化政企关系、党企关系以及国有企业改革提供了参考。
英文摘要：
Party organization participates in the corporate governance is the greatest characteristic of corporate governance in China, and is an important balance power to restrict ＂insiders control＂. By observing the data of state-owned companies that disclosured the party committee information listed in the ＂A＂ share from the year 2008 to 2010,this paper addresses the empirical methods to test the impacts of the leadership system ＂two-way access, cross appointment＂ on the corporate governance and directorate efficiency. The results indicate that ＂two-way access＂ has a inverted ＂U-shaped＂ relationship with the level of corporate governance, and has a positive impact on directorate efficiency. ＂Cross appointment＂ can significantly impact the level of corporate governance. The president as secretary of the party committee against improve the level of corporate governance. The conclusion provides recommendation of optimizing the relation between government and companies, party and companies and the reform of state-owned enterprises.
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