中文摘要：

企业股权安排的核心是寻求“控制权”和“现金流权”的有效匹配和均衡，基于股东同质性假定的“一股一票”投票权设计，因其与股东异质性现实的偏离，并不一定是唯一以及最优的匹配方式。以股东异质性客观事实为基础进行投票权制度创新，或许能提供新的洞见。本文以Facebook收购WhatsApp为研究案例，从股东异质性视角，采用案例研究方法探讨双重股权结构对创始人控制权保持和中小投资者利益保护的治理机理，及其产生中小投资者利益保护效应的作用路径。研究表明：创始人与外部股东在投资目的、资源基础，以及风险承担方面存在明显的差异，此时双重股权结构作为适应股东异质性现实的制度创新，能通过制度化控制权来源保持创始人控制权，并通过维持和保护独特的企业文化、贯彻企业长期战略、提升管理层抗压能力、提高管理层决策效率路径产生中小投资者利益保护效应。并且，这种中小投资者利益保护效应的产生依赖于基于心理所有权和资产专用性投入的创始人自我约束机制控制以及激烈的产品市场竞争约束。本文从股东异质性视角深化了对双重股权结构治理机理的理解，也为化解当前企业发展过程中的“融资与创始人控制权保持”矛盾提供了必要的实践启示。

英文摘要：

The core of corporate ownership arrangement is to search for the effective matching and balancing of ＂control right＂ and ＂cash flow right＂, and the voting design of ＂one share, one vote＂ is not necessarily the only or best way of rights matching for its deviations from the reality of shareholder heterogeneity in corporation. The innovation of voting rights system based on the reality of shareholder heterogeneity in corporation may provide new insights into corporate ownership arrangement. Based on the Facebook acquisition of WhatsApp, and from shareholder heterogeneity perspective, this paper uses a case study to analyze the governance mechanism of dual- class share structure to the founder＇s control maintenance and minority shareholder interest protection, and explore the pathway of minority shareholder interest protection of dual-share structure in corporation. The research indicates that on the condition of being marked difference between founder and outside shareholders, dual-share structure as voting rights innovation can maintain the control of founder through institutionalizing control source, and protect the interests of minority shareholder through the path of maintaining a unique corporate culture, carrying out the corporate long-term strategy, enhancing management ability under pressure and improving the efficiency of management decision-making. Furthermore, the effect of interest protection of minority shareholder depends on the constraint mechanisms of self-constraint mechanism of founder based on the ＂psychological ownership＂ and ＂special assets investment＂ and fierce competitive product markets. This paper explains the governance mechanism of dualclass share structure to founder＇s control maintenance and minority shareholder interest protection from shareholder heterogeneity perspective, and provides a practical inspiration for defusing the conflict of ＂finance and founder control maintainance＂ during the development of corporation.