中文摘要：

文章基于我国重大地震灾害易引起财政剧烈波动的现实背景,借鉴国际上普遍采用的保险机制替代财政救灾的方式,根据我国地震相关历史数据,通过构建地震灾害财政救灾支出负担的积累模型,模拟了在不同保险金额下2014-2020年我国地震灾害财政积累救灾支出负担的变动情况,并以此检验保险如何平滑财政波动风险的事例。研究结果表明：政府购买保险可以有效地平滑财政救灾支出的波动性风险,且波动性与保险赔付呈反向关系。在98%的置信区间与10%的赔付率下,100亿元保额的地震保险可以使财政积累救灾负担的上下界各有0.8%和1.2%的下降,而1 000亿元保额则可以基本消除财政救灾支出的波动性风险。文章研究表明,建立巨灾保险制度可以促进我国经济的稳定运行,有助于政府优化灾害管理、提高救灾效率、发挥市场功能和尽快建立巨灾保险体系。

英文摘要：

Based on the real background that severe earthquakes easily cause fierce volatility of public budget,this paper draws lessons from internationally generally employed insurance mechanism instead of fiscal subsidies and constructs the accumulative model for the earthquake recovery payment burden of government budget through the historical data of earthquakes in China.Then,it stimulates the accumulative earthquake recovery payment burden level for China＇s public budget between 2014 and 2020under different insurance amounts,and tests the smoothing role of insurance in public budget＇s volatility.It comes to the conclusion that government purchase of insurance can effectively smooth the volatility risk of the earthquake recovery payment burden of public budget,and the volatility risk is reverse to the insurance coverage.Assuming 98% confidence interval and 10%payment ratio,10 billion RMB coverage of earthquake insurance can lower the upper and lower intervals of the earthquake recovery payment burden of public budget by 0.8% and1.2%respectively;while 100 billion RMB coverage of earthquake insurance can nearly eliminate the volatility of the earthquake recovery payment burden of public budget.This paper shows that the establishment of catastrophe insurance institution can improve the stability of the economy,and help the governments to optimize the disaster management,increase the disaster relief efficiency and develop a market-oriented disaster insurance system in China.