中文摘要：

以2008—2014年中小板和2009—2014年创业板IPO公司为样本,秉承风险投资的经典治理假说,考察风险投资治理对IPO公司业绩变脸的影响及内部控制在其间的调节作用。研究发现,风险投资参与的企业IPO普遍存在业绩变脸现象,而且参与比例越高,业绩变脸程度越严重。进一步研究发现,高质量内部控制可以弱化风险投资对企业IPO后业绩变脸现象的负面影响,且参与程度越高（风投持股比例越大、参与董事会治理）的公司,抑制作用越明显。研究表明,我国风险投资制度体系发展尚未成熟,风险投资行为表现出明显的“逐名动机”,监管部门要进一步完善风险投资制度体系,强化上市公司内部控制体系的建设,真正实现风险投资的认证监督与创造价值增值目标。

英文摘要：

Taking the IPO companies in SME from 2008 to 2014 and GEM from 2009 to 2014 as the samples, this paper follows the classic VC management hypothesis to examine the impact of venture capital governance on the performance of IPO companies and the regulatory role of internal controls. The results indicate that there exist widely the phenomenon of IPO＇s performance worsening in the companies with the participation of venture capital, the higher the degree of participation, the more serious the performance worsening. Further studies show that high quality internal control can weaken the negative impact of VC on the performance of IPO, the higher the degree of VC partici- pation （higher proportion of VC share holding, participation in the governance of the board）, the more obvious the role will be. The findings suggest that the development of China＇s VC system has not become mature yet; the behavior of VC presents obvious grandstanding motivation. Thus, the regulato- ry departments should further improve the risk investment system and strengthen the construction of the internal control system of listed companies, so as to achieve the goal of certification supervision over venture investment and creation of value increment.