中文摘要：

文章研究了制造商的广告补贴对其开通直销渠道的影响,以单渠道供应链为基准,探讨制造商的渠道选择决策,假设制造商为市场领导者,运用博弈论建立了Bertrand模型,得到了零售商和制造商的最优价格和最优利润。研究发现：当零售商的广告成本较低时,制造商会选择放弃开通直销渠道;当零售商的广告成本较高时,制造商会选择开通直销渠道而且会针对零售商的广告投入增加广告分担比重,然而制造商仍会侵蚀零售商的利润。此外,当零售商广告成本较小时,直销渠道减少了整个供应链价值;当零售商广告成本较大时,直销渠道增加了整个供应链价值。

英文摘要：

This paper focuses on the effects of manufacturer＇s advertising subsidies on the choice of manufacture launching direct channel. The manufacturer＇s channel selection is discussed based on the single-channel supply chain. The Bertrand model is established by using the game theory assuming that the manufacturer is the market leader, and the optimal price and profit of the retailer and the manufacturer are obtained. The results show that when the cost of the advertisement is low, the manufacture dose not launch the online direct channel; when the cost of the advertisement is high, the manufacture dose launch the online direct channel and give the retailer more advertising subsidies, however, the retailer suffers from the manufacture encroachment. In addition, when the retailer＇s advertising costs are small, the direct sales channel reduces the value of the entire supply chain; when the retailer advertising costs are large,the direct sales channel to increase the value of the entire supply chain.