中文摘要：

高管薪酬问题并不在于“薪酬数额之高”，而在于薪酬与公司业绩是否紧密关联。基于2009-2012年A股中存在高管薪酬与业绩脱钩现象的上市公司数据，研究发现：高管薪酬辩护行为对薪酬一业绩脱钩程度有正向影响，即相对报酬低的公司高管薪酬一业绩脱钩程度较高；公司中高管权力越大，高管的薪酬辩护行为对薪酬一业绩脱钩程度的正向影响越大，即高管相对报酬低与更高的薪酬一业绩脱钩程度间的关联关系，更可能出现在高管权力较大的公司中。

英文摘要：

Executive compensation issue is not ＂high-paying＂, but rather the pay is closely related to corporate performance or not. Based on the data of executive compensation unmoored from performance in A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2012, we find that： Justifying compensation has a positive effect on the degree of pay unmoored from performance. Namely, the higher degree of pay unmoored from performance finds its expression in companies that give relative low pay to their executives. If the executives are more powerful, justifying compensation will has a more positive effect on the degree of pay unmoored from performance. The relationship between relatively low-paying and higher degree of pay unmoored from performance is more likely to appear in the companies that exeeutives aremore powerful