中文摘要：

基于1990～2012年间43个重大工程的208个高层管理者样本，构建了我国重大工程高层管理者政治激励影响因素模型。研究结果表明，我国重大工程为40～45岁间、高学历、低行政级别、担任常务副职的高层管理者提供了较好的升职空间；50岁成为政治擢升概率的分水岭；项目任期与擢升概率之间呈现“U”型关系；欠发达地区相比发达地区更愿意提拔具备驾驭重大工程能力的官员。随着我国基础设施水平逐年提高，工程管理型官员的擢升机会从20世纪90年代的高点逐年降低；造价控制水平与晋升名额间尚未挂钩，不利于遏制重大工程频发的造价超支现象。

英文摘要：

With selected representative samples of 208 top managers from 43 major projects be tween 1990 and 2012, this study established an impact factor analysis model of administrative incen- tives for top managers in major projects. It is found that Chinese major projects provide promotion op- portunities for top managers who are between 40 to 45 years old, well educated, at lower administra- tive level and taking the position of standing deputy executives, and the age of 50-year-old or more is a turning point for the administrative promotion. There is a U shaped relationship between tenure and administrative incentives ratio. Compared with developed regions, given the ability of managing major projects, the officials are more likely to be promoted in undeveloped areas. Also, it is found that with the increasing number of infrastructures, from the 1990s, the promotion opportunities had been re- duced for officials of project management. Furthermore, it remains irrelevant between cost control level and administrative promotion quota, which is not conducive to curb frequent cost overruns phe- nomenon in major projects.