中文摘要：

本文以2008-2010年我国制造业上市公司为研究样本,采用层次回归分析法探讨转型期公司治理机制下经理管理防御对企业R＆D投入的影响。首先研究经理管理防御与R＆D投入之间的关系,然后引入激励机制与约束机制作为调节变量,研究公司治理对二者之间关系的调节作用。实证研究结果表明：经理管理防御与R＆D投入具有显著负相关关系;经理人薪酬、股权集中度的提高可以有效抑制管理防御下的低R＆D投入,独立董事比例提高会促进管理防御下的低R＆D投入,经理人持股对管理防御与R＆D投入之间的关系没有明显调节作用。

英文摘要：

Based on Chinese listed companies in the manufacturing industry 2008 -2010, the hierarchical regression analysis method was used to investigate the impact of managerial entrenchment on R＆D investment under corporate governance mechanism in the transition period. Firstly, the relationship between managerial entrenchment and R＆D investment was estimated; Second- ly, incentive mechanism and restrictive mechanism as moderator were introduced into this research. They were used to study the impact of corporate governance mechanism on the relationship between the two others. The empirical findings indicated that there was a significant negative correlation between managerial entrenchment and R＆D investment. Moreover, the low R＆D investment under managerial entrenchment could be effectively inhibited by increasing managers＇ compensation and ownership concentration, while it would be promoted by the raise of the proportion of independent directors. And managerial ownership has no significant regulating effect on the relationship between managerial entrenchment and R＆D investment.