中文摘要：

破产重整是危机企业解除财务危机的重要法定机制。本文基于执法经济学理论，以宝硕股份的破产重整事件为例，研究了新破产法实施后上市公司破产重整的经济效率。研究发现，虽然宝硕股份借助重整机制暂时避免了破产清算，但是重整活动却明显缺乏经济效率，新破产法在执行过程中偏离了原先的立法预期，相对落后的执法环境致使参与重整的利益相关方的目标函数和博弈行为发生异化，并最终导致重整的低效率。本文揭示了我国转型期相对落后的执法环境制约企业破产重整效率的典型作用路径。最后，本文提出了若干政策建议。

英文摘要：

Bankruptcy reorganization is a legal mechanism through which firms in distress get out of fi-nancial distress. Based on the economic theory of law enforcement, this paper chose the reorganization event of Baoshuo Co., Ltd. to study the efficiency of bankruptcy reorganization of listed companies after the new bankruptcy law was enforced. The research shows that although Baoshuo Co., Ltd. temporarily avoided bankruptcy liquidation by taking advantage of the restructing mechanism,its reorganization pro-cedure as a whole was not efficient. The enforcement of the new bankruptcy law deviated from the origi-nal expectations of legislation, and the relatively less favorable environment of law enforcement resulted in dissimilation of stakeholders＇ objective functions and game behaviors,and thus the less efficient reorgani- zation. This paper reveals a typical path through which a less favorable environment of law enforcement restrains the efficiency of bankruptcy reorganization, and finally, it puts forward some policy suggestions about enhancing the efficiency of reorganization.