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中文摘要：
针对1个供应商和2个竞争零售商组成的分销供应链,研究了不同竞争强度下的联盟定价策略和稳定性.首先基于Stackelberg博弈模型给出了不同联盟结构下的定价策略;然后利用合作博弈理论中的Shapley值分配了联盟利润并探讨了大联盟的短视稳定性;最后运用最大一致集理论探讨了各种联盟结构的远视稳定性.结果表明,只有当竞争强度比较弱时,基于Shapley值分配利润的大联盟是短视稳定的;从远视的角度,供应链系统更可能出现的联盟结构为供应商一零售商联盟;当竞争激烈时,2个零售商的联盟也是远视稳定的.
英文摘要：
For a two-echelon distribution supply chain composed of a single supplier and two competing retailers,the alliance＇s pricing strategy and stability are studied under different competitive intensities.Firstly,this paper analyzes the different alliance pricing strategies based on Stackelberg games;then it allocates the alliance profits based on Shapley value and considers the myopic stability of the grand coalition;finally,it discusses the farsighted stability of all the coalition structures.The result shows that the grand coalition is myopically stable only when the competitive intensity is relatively weak,and that the supplier-retailer alliance is more likely to happen in the long run.With intense competition,the two-retailer alliance is also farsighted stability.
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