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中文摘要：
经理的机会主义引发企业过度投资行为。西方学者通过考察投资与现金流相关性，研究企业过度投资问题并找到相应经验证据。本文利用上市公司（2005会计年度）数据，研究制造业上市公司是否存在过度投资行为以及相关制约机制是否有效。结果表明：我国上市公司存在过度投资行为；经理持股、举借债务、大股东性质、现金股利是过度投资行为的有效制约机制；公司治理机制中的独立董事并未发挥作用。
英文摘要：
Managers＇ opportunism leads to over-investment behavior. By using investment-cash sensitivity, western scholars have found empirical evidences on over-investment behavior. Using data of 2005, the paper analyzes over-investment behavior and corresponding restriction systems in China＇s listed manufacturing companies. The result shows that, firstly, there is over-investment behavior in China＇s listed manufacturing companies; secondly, managerial stockholding, liabilities, major shareholder＇s identity and cash dividends are effective restriction systems on over-investment behavior; thirdly, independent directors have no effects on over-investment behavior.
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