中文摘要：

本文以中国上市公司为研究对象，探讨两权分离与控股股东侵占中小股东利益的关系。通过对1154家上市公司长期数据的分析，我们发现控制权和彭L金流权的分离引致利益侵占，显著降低了IPO长期回报率。然而，在政府控股参司中，两权分离并未显著降低公司IPO长期回报。实际上，政府控股公司的两权分离有助于减少资金占用、增加股利分配、降低关联交易，也能减轻社会性负担和降低经理人代理成本。可见，在政府控股企业中，两权分离有助于减少政治干预，约束攫取之手，提升企业运营的市场化水平。

英文摘要：

This paper studies the public listed firms in China and discuss the relationship between the control-ownership wedge and the exploitation of the small shareholders. After analyzing the long-term per- formance data of 1154 listed companies, we find that the separation of rights leads to the tunneling of corpo- rate benefits and significantly decreases the long-term IPO returns. However, the control-ownership wedge in government-controlled firms does not reduce the long-term return on equity. Actually, separating control from cash-flow rights of the government shareholder can help prevent the occupation of funds, increase divi- dends, and reduce the related-party transactions, as well as reduce the social burdens and agency costs. In the firms with the government as the controlling shareholder, the separation of rights can reduce political in- tervention, deter the grabbing hand and enhance the marketization level of corporate operation.