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中文摘要：
以2007年1月～2010年6月发行短期融资券和中期票据的上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了在银行间债券市场,政治关联对公司新增债务融资规模和债务期限结构的影响。研究发现,高管政治关联有利于公司获得更高水平的融资规模,而且这种便利性在短期融资券和中期票据融资中都有体现。不同于以往研究,当以增量法刻画债务期限结构,并以债券种类代表公司新增债务期限时,研究发现政治关联公司更可能以短期融资券融资,而不是中期票据。
英文摘要：
Using the data of listed companies which issued the short-term debts and medium-term notes from January 2007 to June 2010,this paper analyzes how the political connection works on the companies＇ debt financing amount and term structure.To the debts amounts,the political connection can help the company to achieve higher levels of debts financing both by short-term debts and medium-term note.To the debt maturity structure defined by the new debt,contrary to the existing literature,the companies with political connection are more likely to issue the short-term debts rather than medium-term notes.
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