中文摘要：

外部治理环境的改善会约束盈余管理,而终极控制人出于自身私利对盈余管理的作用会有差异.基于地区差异视角,以2004年-2011年中国沪深两市700家上市公司持续8年的动态面板数据为研究对象,运用系统广义矩估计检验了外部治理环境对上市公司盈余管理的影响,并考察了上市公司终极控制人在其中发挥的作用.研究发现,外部治理环境与上市公司盈余管理均呈负相关关系;终极控制人性质及行政级别不同的情况下,外部治理环境对盈余管理的影响存在差异.具体而言,相对于非政府控制上市公司,外部治理环境对政府控制上市公司的盈余管理行为约束力更强.相对于地方政府控制上市公司,外部治理环境对中央政府控制上市公司盈余管理行为发挥着更大的约束作用.以上结果表明终极控制人在外部治理环境与盈余管理关系中发挥着重要的调节作用.

英文摘要：

Improvement in external governance environment can constrain the earnings management,and out of personal gains,the ultimate controller can play a different role towards earnings management.From the external governance environment perspective,applying dynamic panel data consisting 836 companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges in the period 2004-2011,we test the impact of external institutional environment on earnings management using system GMM method,and examine the role of listed companys＇ ultimate controllers.The results show：External institutional environment is negatively correlated with earnings management.External institutional environment affects earnings management differently depending on the characteristics and administrative ranks of the ultimate controllers.Specifically,external institutional environment plays a more significant role in constraining earnings management in state-controlled listed companies compared with non-state-controlled ones.Furthermore,external governance environment seems to be more effective in restraining earnings management in listed companies under central government＇ s control compared with the ones under the control of regional governments.To conclude,the results illustrate the crucial role that the ultimate controller plays in regulating external governance and earnings management.This study enriches the researches of earnings management,thus contributes to the understanding of the institutional root-cause of the differences in earnings management behaviors among Chinese listed companies.